A best response is defined as usual:
And a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (d 1 , ..., d n ) such that d i ∈ Br i (t) for all d i . A Nash equilibrium is strict if any other strategy by any player delivers a strictly worse payoff to that player. A successful negotiation will be one that achieves a feasible solution defined as a set of demands where all players are better off than their max demand out of agreement. This amounts to: Additionally, a disagreement outcome will be a set of demands such that agreement cannot be facilitated by any single player changing her strategy. More precisely:
Definition 2. A set of demands (d 1 , ..., d n ) is a disagreement outcome iff T i s i < ( i s i d i ) − (s j d j − s j δM ax j ) for all players j.
Strict Nash equilibria
It is possible to prove some general results about the equilibria of the game. More specifically, there are both feasible solutions and disagreement equilibria that are strict Nash equilibria. Strict Nash equilibria form strongly stable states for a wide range of learning dynamics (Weibull, 1995) . Proposition 1. Feasible solutions are strict Nash equilibria iff t = T i s i .
Proof. Proof proceeds by cases.
(i) Suppose (d 1 , ..., d n ) is a feasible solution such that t = T i s i . Without loss of generality, let d j represent the demand of player j. Now consider an alternative strategy for j,
(ii) Suppose that (d 1 , ..., d n ) is a strict Nash equilibrium and is a feasible solution (t ≤ T i s i ). Without loss of generality, let d j represent the demand of player j. If t < T i s i , then the strategy
Proposition 2. If (M ax 1 , ..., M ax n ) is a disagreement outcome, then it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
for all players j. Without loss of generality let d j represent the demand of player j. Now consider an alternative strategy for j, d j < M ax j and an associated alternative total t . Note d j ≥ δM ax j by definition of the strategy set. So, t > T i s i by supposition and π j (d j , t ) = δd j < π j (d j , t) = δd j and j is strictly worse off with d j . Therefore, (M ax 1 , ..., M ax n ) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Learning dynamics and simulations
To investigate whether and how frequently the various equilibria are reached by agents, we employ simulations of adaptive agents in negotiations. Agents are given a determinate size s i at the beginning of the simulations. Negotiations are modeled as a series of rounds where simultaneous demands are made in the bargaining game. Initial states are determined by a random variable drawn from [δM ax i , M ax i ] with a uniform distribution. After each round, the demands of all agents are available to all others. Where the strategies are restricted, the initial states are drawn from a uniform distribution in the adjusted strategy set.
Beginning in the second round, agents form expectations of the other agents behavior by examining their history of play. The estimate for an agent's future is the mean of all past demands from that agent. Using these estimates each agent determines what their best-response demand is for the next round. In the next round, they make that demand, observe the demands of all other agents and update their expectations.
Simulations (written in C) are run for 100 rounds. If the expected demand of all players yields a total within 1% of the target value or less (t ≤ T i s i + .01), the negotiation is deemed to be successful. The data points presented in the main text are averaged from 10,000 independent simulations.
Description of simulation procedure
Initializing the simulation: Each agent i in a set of players is assigned a positive real number s i to denote player size. They are then assigned a closed-interval [δM ax i , M ax i ] ⊆ [0, 1], which represents the player's strategy set. The parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) represents the payoff discount in the event of a failed negotiation.
For each independently simulated negotiation players are assigned initial demands randomly. Let d 
For each r ≥ 2, each agent i calculates the total expected demands of all other players j = i for that round:
Each agent then compares E(t r i ) to the target value (T ) weighted by player size:
This determines what is in effect the remainder of the available goods given the expected demands of other players. The best response for player i is to demand this remainder adjusted by s i provided that demand falls within i's strategy set:
and both are included when agents are calculating expected demands. This means that initial demands effectively receive additional weight compared with subsequent demands. The reason for this assumption is that in climate negotiations much is known about the initial conditions and attitudes of other agents. Thus, it reasonable to include the pre-negotiation state d 0 i that leads to initial demands as part of an agents estimate of others. Furthermore, while this assumption does not alter the qualitative results discussed in the article, it does tend to increase the success rates of negotiations, making the effects of various factors considered more apparent.
Stopping the simulation: If, at any point, the actual demand of all players is equivalent to their expected demands, there will be no subsequent change of demands and the simulation is terminated. If this condition is not met, simulations are terminated after 100 rounds of negotiation.
Classifying the result: After the final round of negotiation (r=100), the cumulative expected demands of all players, i E(d 101 i )s i , is compared to the global target value, T i s i . If this expectation is within 0.01 of the global target value, the negotiation is deemed successful. Otherwise, it is deemed a failure.
Traditional fictitious play
The learning rule described above differs from traditional fictitious play, which does not form expectations by taking averages of opponents play, but by assuming opponents are playing mixed strategies. A mixed strategy is one that randomizes among pure strategies and is represented with a probability distribution over pure strategies. Traditional fictitious play assumes that opponents are playing a fixed mixed strategy where the probability of playing a given pure strategy is equal to the frequency of the opponent using that strategy relative to all past play. Agents then choose a best response-a strategy that maximizes expected utility-relative to their opponents' expected mixed strategies.
Traditional fictitious play faces a number of complications within our model. First, there is a continuous strategy space, which means that as the number of rounds of negotiation increases, calculating best responses becomes computationally intractable. Second, agents using fictitious play are known to occasionally fall into alternating patterns of miscoordination. In such patterns, both players attempt to simultaneously accommodate the other player, then switch back to accommodate again, and fall into an indefinite cycle (Shapley, 1964) .
Our modified learning rule has the advantage of avoiding these complications. However, it is also possible to modify the setup of the game in order to investigate traditional fictitious play. First, we can discretize the strategy space, meaning players can only make demands at certain intervals (we will use 0.1, 0.2,...,1.0). This makes the computational tasks of the agents much more tractable. Second, we can introduce some "inertia" into the learning process where, with some probability, individuals simply do not change their behavior after a given round of play (we will use a value of 0.2 for this probability in simulations). This randomness will interupt possible inefficient cycling patterns.
Despite the differences between our modified learning rule and traditional fictitious play, the two learning rules generate qualitatively similar results (see the supplemental results below). The traditional rule is slightly less successful and favors smaller players in successful agreements. Additionally, even with the discretized strategy space, the computations in simulations are significantly more complicated than our modified rule, making it more difficult to examine situations with large numbers of players.
Comparison of modified and traditional fictitious play
To examine traditional fictitious play in our bargaining model in a tractable way, let the strategy space for each player be: strat i = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0}. In cases where δ > 0.1, demands lower than δ were removed. Even with this simplification, calculating opponent mixed strategies and best responses for each agent takes exponentially more computation for each additional agent in the game. For this reason, we were only able to simulate models of five or fewer agents. Even in this limited setting, however, the results were qualitatively similar to those of the modified learning rule presented in the main text. In all simulations presented here, it was assumed that on 20% of rounds, agents would not update behavior and maintain their previous demand. In cases where there were multiple best-response options, the lower demand was always preferred.
Many of the results for traditional fictitious play qualitatively similar to those of the modified version that are reported in the main text. As the number of players increased, it dramatically reduced the rate of achieving a successful agreement (Table 1) . Heterogeneity of players tends to help reaching an agreement, as fewer players makeup larger proportions of potential total demands success becomes easier to achieve (Table 2) . Examining a three-player setting with players of various sizes reveals that reduction burdens fall disproportionally on larger players (Table 3). Restricting initial bargaining demands enhances the prospects for reaching successful agreements (Table 4) . Finally, traditional fictitious play also yields the result that prior reductions are most effective if done by a larger number of smaller players as opposed to fewer larger players (Table 5) .
There are a few differences between the two learning rules that are worth noting. First, the modified version of fictitious play typically outperforms the traditional version in this bargaining game, being more likely to achieve an agreement. Second, with respect to the effect of prior agreements on negotiations, the traditional rule is far less sensitive to potential increases in minimum demands than the modified version (Table 5) . Finally, the distribution of burden in reductions tends to fall much more on the larger players when agents use traditional fictitious play than the modified version, in which results are more equitable (Table 3 ).
Relation to standard bargaining solutions
Bargaining games have a long and rich history in game theory. The standard approach to bargaining games is to characterize certain equilibria as more desirable, fair, or otherwise salient solutions (Nash, 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; Kalai, 1977) . For discussion and overview of bargaining problems and solutions see, e.g., Binmore (1998 Binmore ( , 2007 Muthoo (1999) .
To compare standard bargaining solutions to learning through traditional and our modified version of fictitious play, consider the simple two player case where s 1 = 2.0, s 2 = 1.0, δ = 0.2 and T = 0.5. Figure 1 shows a plot of the feasible solutions and identifies the various standard bargaining solutions.
Neither traditional fictitious play, nor our modified version converge exactly to any of these specific solutions. Each learning rule produces a wide variety of possible outcomes all along the set of feasible solutions which meet the target value. However, if we examine the average distribution between players, some interesting comparisons emerge. The average solution for traditional fictitious play was approximately 0.406 for player 1 and 0.677 for player 2, relatively close to the Nash bargaining solution. For the modified fictitious play, the average solution was approximately 0.455 for player 1 and 0.590 for player 2, very close to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
